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Ulster Weeks:  
“England’s Prosperity Must Be Ulster’s Opportunity” 1
Abstract: Brexit has, once again, thrown into sharp relief the uncertain relationship between 
Ulster unionism and their fellow citizens. Since 1948 a constant concern for unionism 
has been worries that British ambiguity towards Northern Ireland will eventually see the 
province jettisoned and abandoned, to be subsumed into the Republic of Ireland. For 
most of the wider British population attempts by unionism and loyalism to reaffirm their 
Britishness go no further than parading, flags and the crash of the Lambeg drum. However, 
some attempts such as unionism’s involvement in the Festival of Britain have been marked 
by considerable sophistication. Amongst these efforts were the Ulster Weeks campaigns in 
the United Kingdom. These were part of the wider “Bridge Building” project initiated by 
Prime Minister Terence O’Neill. Ulster Weeks are now largely forgotten beyond a few lines 
or footnotes and had no lasting impact; like so much, they were destroyed by the violence 
of the Troubles. This paper will show that notwithstanding the modernist language of the 
project they would often fall back on traditional imagery. It exposes a project that despite its 
rhetoric which wanted to promote a modern, technologically advanced Northern Ireland, 
it also wanted to uphold a Northern Ireland that was Protestant, British and loyal. Once 
again, the message would fail to expunge British disinterestedness over Northern Ireland’s 
place in the Union. This paper will conclude that whilst the Troubles ultimately brought 
about the end of the project, it had already been rejected by unionists that wanted to destroy 
O’Neill’s bridges and nationalists who wanted “Civil Rights not Civic Weeks”. Further, it will 
argue that hard-line unionism has failed to learn the lessons of the Ulster Weeks campaigns.
Keywords: unionism, nationalism, Northern Ireland, Ulster, Ulster Week, Terence O’Neill.
Résumé : Le Brexit a une nouvelle fois mis en lumière la relation incertaine entre les unionistes 
d’Ulster et leurs concitoyens. Depuis 1948, les unionistes craignent que l’ambiguïté britannique 
vis-à-vis de l’Irlande du Nord provoque l’abandon de la province et son absorption par la 
République d’Irlande. Pour la majeure partie de la population britannique dans son ensemble, 
les tentatives de l’unionisme et du loyalisme de réaffirmer leur identité britannique se résument 
à défiler, agiter des drapeaux et faire résonner le tambour de Lambeg. Cependant, certaines 
tentatives telles que la participation de l’unionisme au Festival of Britain ont été extrêmement 
élaborées, à travers par exemple les campagnes nommées Ulster Weeks au Royaume-Uni. Celles-ci 
faisaient partie du projet plus vaste de « construction de ponts » initié par le Premier ministre 
Terence O’Neill. Les Ulster Weeks sont maintenant largement oubliées, si ce n’est pour quelques 
lignes ou notes de bas de page, et n’ont eu aucun impact durable ; comme beaucoup, elles ont été 
détruites par la violence des Troubles. Cet article montrera que, malgré le langage moderniste 
du projet, elles se retranchaient souvent derrière des images traditionnelles. Nous exposerons un 
1. “Speech by Senator the Rt. Hon. J. L. O. Andrews, D.L., at the Inauguration of Ulster Week in 
Birmingham”, 21 April 1969, Public Record Office Northern Ireland (hereafter PRONI).
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projet qui, malgré une rhétorique qui visait à promouvoir une Irlande du Nord moderne et à la 
pointe de la technologie, voulait également défendre une Irlande du Nord à la fois protestante, 
britannique et loyale. Une fois encore, le message ne parvenait pas à dissiper le désintéressement 
britannique de la place de l’Irlande du Nord dans l’Union. Nous conclurons que, si les Troubles 
ont finalement mis fin au projet, il avait déjà été rejeté par les unionistes qui souhaitaient détruire 
les ponts d’O’Neill et par les nationalistes qui souhaitaient des « droits civils et non des semaines 
civiques ». L’unionisme radical n’a pas réussi à tirer les leçons des Ulster Weeks.
Mots clés : unionisme, nationalisme, Irlande du Nord, Ulster, Ulster Week, Terence O’Neill.
The current debate about the United Kingdom’s place and role in Europe has once 
again brought to the surface of British politics Ulster unionists’ concerns over the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland and their membership of the British 
“family” of nations. A survey completed by Kings College London revealed the 
continuing indifference of voters in Great Britain towards Northern Ireland’s place 
in the Union 2. After 1922 Ireland was submerged beneath the surface of British 
politics. Occasionally Northern Ireland would manage to force its way into the vision 
of those on the governmentbenches in Westminster. The decision by Costello to 
announce the withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1948 and declare Ireland a 
Republic forced London to turn its attention to Belfast and Dublin when its gaze 
was firmly fixed on the post-war reconstruction of Europe and the withdrawal from 
empire. In the creation of the Ireland Act (1949), Atlee and his cabinet achieved two 
goals, they prevented a potential crisis within the Commonwealth and returned the 
issue of partition to the back-benches. Whilst this did secure Northern Ireland’s 
membership of the Union, this was a secondary consideration; saving a British 
enclave in Ireland was not the primary consideration for Atlee and Labour, who 
were far more concerned about damaging the Commonwealth.
Although Northern Ireland’s position in the Union now appeared secure this 
did not stop unionism viewing their future with uncertainty. They began to look 
for an opportunity to confirm Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United 
Kingdom. It was decided that unionism had to find a way to promote itself to 
the rest of the United Kingdom. The 1951 Festival of Britain was recognised as 
an opportunity to do this. The Festival of Britain would be a “high-profile means 
of confirming Northern Ireland’s place in the Union” and a “rallying point for 
Protestant rank and file” 3. The festival plans for Belfast was not without its critics. 
Harry Diamond MP, Nesca Robb and Sam Hannah Bell recognised the potential 
controversy that could result of the festival, warning that “our history, for historical 
reasons, is still warm in the hands of zealots” 4. These concerns did not stop the 
Northern Ireland government from wanting to ensure that it was integrated as far 
2. “Survey: Only Third of Britons Want Northern Ireland to Stay in UK – Brexit Pressure on Union”, 
Belfast Telegraph, 3 April 2019.
3. Gillian McIntosh, The Force of Culture: Unionist Identities in Twentieth-Century Ireland, Cork, 
Cork University Press, 1999, p. 103.
4. Ibid., p. 112-113.
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as possible with the wider festival 5. Unionists in Northern Ireland intended to use 
the festival to show the rest of the United Kingdom that it was a loyal, Protestant 
member of the British nation and the United Kingdom 6.
After the Conservative election victory in 1951, unionists in Northern Ire-
land had little to fear from British politics. The Conservative Party remained in 
power for over a decade and had no interest in anything that would disturb the 
constitutional settlement. However, despite the years of Conservative dominance, 
technological advances, global economic growth and generational differences were 
to have consequences in both the United Kingdom and Ireland. Globally, during the 
second half of the 1950s the older pre-war world would encounter a new generation 
that viewed older traditions, politicians and ideologies as the pillars of stagnation.
In the UK and Ireland this produced three leaders, each believing in their own 
version of the modernisation thesis. Harold Wilson wanted to create a Britain forged 
in the “White Heat” of technology 7. Sean Lemass wanted to show the world that 
Ireland was not a small nation of the periphery of Europe. Lemass hoped that this 
transformation would show unionists in Northern Ireland that should reunification 
take place, they would be joining a state opening up to a modern world and peeling 
away the previous layers of protectionism 8. In Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Terence O’Neill was also looking to use his own interpretation of modernisation. 
He wanted to “change the face of Ulster” 9. O’Neill believed that he if could promote 
an image of Northern Ireland that dovetailed with Wilson’s then this would have 
two consequences; firstly, increasing the economic and industrial development of 
Northern Ireland and secondly, to ensure Northern Ireland would remain part 
of the United Kingdom 10. Loughlin argues that for this to work O’Neill had to 
convince three groups of his intentions. He had to persuade his fellow unionists 
to modernise their own political and religious views. There was the need to cajole 
nationalists to accept the argument that modernisation would bring equality, social 
justice and remove the need for reunification. The final group he had to win over 
were the remaining British. He had to show them that Northern Ireland was a 
bona fide, modern part of the British nation 11. In a speech he made in 1966, O’Neill 
told his audience that there were those in Britain “who listen too readily to our 
enemies, and who ignore the evidence of Ulster’s loyalty” 12. To demonstrate this, 
the Northern Ireland government would launch a charm offensive in Britain. This 
5. James Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity Since 1885, London, F. Pinter, 
1995, p. 155.
6. Ibid., p. 155-160.
7. Harold Wilson, Labour’s Plan for Science: Reprint of Speech by the Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, MP, 
Leader of the Labour Party, at the Annual Conference, Scarborough, Tuesday October 1, 1963, 
London, Victoria House Printing Company, 1963.
8. Bryce Evans, Seán Lemass, Democratic Dictator, Cork, The Collins Press, 2011, p. 212-229.
9. “Ulster Week Greets You in Leeds”, Yorkshire Evening Post, 24 April 1967.
10. James Loughlin, Ulster Unionism…, p. 155-160 and p. 175-176.
11. Ibid., p. 176.
12. Margaret O’Callaghan, Catherine O’Donnell, “The Northern Ireland Government, the ‘Paisleyite 
Movement’ and Ulster Unionism in 1966”, Irish Political Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, 2006, p. 204.
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would be a series of “Ulster Weeks” to convince their fellow citizens that Northern 
Ireland was as authentically modern as the rest of the British 13. It was decided that 
“England’s Prosperity must be Ulster’s Opportunity” 14.
O’Neill wanted to use Ulster Weeks to reach out to the other British regions to 
encourage “friendship and better knowledge” about Northern Ireland 15. They would 
be a mix of propaganda, trade initiatives and colourful ceremonial. The reasons for 
focusing on British regional cities were made clear by O’Neill before the official 
launch of the first Ulster Week in Nottingham. O’Neill invited to Stormont the lord 
mayor of Nottingham and the chairman of Nottinghamshire County Council. In a 
speech to his guests, he revealed more of the motivation behind Ulster Weeks. He 
and his ministers had recognised the growing economic strength of London and 
the Greater South East. The British economy was shifting from the older northern 
industrial cities. The economic performance of the Greater South East and the 
economic imbalance that was being created was an increasing concern for regional 
politicians. O’Neill recognised that this economic shift would have consequences 
for Northern Ireland. He wanted to show the officials from Nottingham that they 
had a common goal, to ensure their relative economic prosperity.
When the first Ulster Week in Nottingham was launched it was accompanied 
by a glossy magazine Industrial Nottingham: Ulster Week in Nottingham 16. Features 
were also covered in multiple local newspapers, local television and later, British 
Pathé covered Ulster Week in Manchester 17.
The material produced to publicise Ulster Week in Sheffield was typical of the 
amount and type of literature produced to publicise other Ulster Weeks (see table).
The promotional material for Ulster Week in Leeds included 12 large “Ulster” 
banners, 2,000 smaller banners, 5,000 red hands, 5,000 lapel badges and 50,000 leaf-
lets 18. For Ulster Week in Birmingham, the Birmingham Post carried a special 
supplement “Ulster in Birmingham” which told its readership that Ulster was 
the place “Where whiskey began” and now made everything from “From carpet 
sweepers to guided missiles” 19. A full sized replica 18th-century cottage was displayed 
at Rackhams Department Store. Its primary purpose was to illustrate Northern 
Ireland’s claim to have links with ten United States presidents 20. At the same time 
Birmingham businesses were being encouraged to invest in Northern Ireland’s 
“bright new future” and the “21st century city”, Craigavon 21.
13. James Loughlin, Ulster Unionism…, p. 176.
14. “Speech by Senator the Rt. Hon. J. L. O. Andrews, D.L., at the Inauguration of Ulster Week in 
Birmingham”, 21 April 1969, PRONI.
15. Government of Northern Ireland Information Service, “Extract of Speech by the Prime Minister”, 
23 September 1964, PRONI.
16. Industrial Nottingham: Ulster Week in Nottingham, September 1964, PRONI.
17. Ulster Week in Manchester, British Pathé, 1968, on line: https://www.britishpathe.com/video/
manchester-ulster-week/query/Ulster+week.
18. Government of Northern Ireland, press release, 3 April 1967, PRONI.
19. “Ulster in Birmingham: A Birmingham Post Special Supplement”, Birmingham Post, 18 April 1968.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
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Source: “Ulster Week in Sheffield”, 2 May 1966, PRONI.
Sport was also used to promote the aims of Ulster Weeks. In Edinburgh there 
was a football match between Hearts and Coleraine 22. Another match was arranged 
for Ulster Week in Newcastle where Newcastle United would play Linfield (who 
were the Irish League champions) and the Senior Services Golf Tournament would 
take place at Northumberland Golf Club 23.
An innovative promotional feature of Ulster Week in Southampton was the 
location of the launch event. This took place on the S.A. Oranje, a South African 
liner that had been built by Harland and Wolff in 1947 24. Despite the growing 
international condemnation of the apartheid regime, no concern was shown about 
using a South African flagged ship to begin Ulster Week in Southampton. There 
was one small drama that was played out just before the start of events. At the same 
time as Ulster Week in Southampton, the Northern Ireland government had also 
been promoting Northern Ireland fabric and fashion at London Fashion Week. 
The event was attended by Princess Margaret, who delayed O’Neill’s departure for 
Southampton, resulting in a dash through London traffic with a police escort to get 
him to Southampton on time for the official launch 25. Kensington Palace would later 
send a letter to O’Neill to tell him of the Princess’s “pleasure” at attending the show 26.
22. Government of Northern Ireland, press release, 11 August 1965, PRONI.
23. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Ulster Week Newcastle Upon Tyne”, 16 Sep-
tember 1966, PRONI.
24. “Ulster Week Event in Liner”, Belfast Telegraph, 19 October 1967.
25. “Princess Kept the PM Late”, Belfast Telegraph, 24 October 1967.
26. “Letter to Captain the Rt. Hon. Terence O’Neill, DL, MP, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, by 
Private Secretary to the Princess Margaret, Countess of Snowdon”, 30 October 1967, PRONI.
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The organisers also reached out to their supporters in Britain to ensure the 
success of events. In Sheffield they received support from the local Ulster Society 27. 
The president of the Ulster Society in Sheffield was William James Lytle who was 
born in Maghera, County Londonderry and was Fellow of the Royal College of 
Surgeons 28. When he arrived in Manchester, O’Neill was welcomed by Winifred 
Austin, the Secretary of the Manchester Ulster Society 29. Prior to the Ulster Week in 
Bristol O’Neill had dinner with the Reading Ulster Association 30. The Birmingham 
Ulster Society also hosted a dinner for their guests from Northern Ireland.
There were also more subtle markers of Ulster Weeks. For each event, special 
slogan postmarks were used. Each postmark would have the name of the city where 
the campaign was taking place, the date and the six-pointed star.
Another important part of Ulster Weeks was the pomp and ceremony of 
military spectacle. During Ulster Week in Bristol the band of the Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers beat retreat and marched through the city. The Royal Navy was represented 
by HMS Russell (a Type 14 second-rate frigate), which had previously been part 
of the Londonderry Squadron. Throughout Ulster Week, the Red Hand of Ulster 
would be on prominent display from the ship’s funnel 31. In Newcastle-Upon-Tyne 
the Royal Ulster Rifles would be on parade. In Leeds it was the turn of the Drums 
and Pipes of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Whilst in Leeds, Terrence O’Neill had a 
personal surprise waiting for him when he was unexpectedly reunited with his 
former batman from his service with the Irish Guards 32. In Manchester, the most 
popular element of Ulster Week was the presence of three Royal Navy submarines. 
Their cruise into Manchester along the ship canal was covered extensively by the 
media and they received 10,000 visitors 33. The intent was for the submarines to 
reinforce the role played by the Royal Navy in Northern Ireland during the Second 
World War. However, the future of the submarine squadron in Northern Ireland 
was already being questioned and the submarines themselves were approaching 
obsolescence in a world dominated by nuclear weapons. The link with the Royal 
Navy was already in decline. The Londonderry Squadron was disbanded in 1966 
and the Submarine school would close in 1970. The Royal Navy’s connection to 
Northern Ireland was passing into history.
This all carried an important political message from the unionist government. 
They wanted to convince their fellow citizens that they were British and an integral 
part of the United Kingdom. In Edinburgh O’Neill combined technological and 
27. M. Smith, “Letter to Terrence O’Neill by The Ulster Society of Sheffield”, 28 March 1966, PRONI.
28. N. S. Sivarajasingham, A. Kingsnorth, “William James Lytle: A Historical Review”, Hernia, vol. 6, 
no. 4, 2002, p. 198-203.
29. Michael Herbert, The Wearing of the Green: A Political History of the Irish in Manchester, London, 
Irish in Britain Representation Group, 2001, p. 146.
30. “Capt. O’Neill not Meeting Mr. Wilson”, Birmingham Post, 20 March 1965.
31. Ibid.
32. Government of Northern Ireland, press release, 24 April 1967, PRONI. A batman is an orderly 
or personal servant assigned to a commissioned officer.
33. “10,000 visitors for submarines”, The Guardian, 4 March 1968.
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economic modernity with older, historical links with Scotland. In a speech to 
mark the inauguration of the Edinburgh Ulster Week he told the audience that 
“our peoples are closely related in blood, in traditions and in character. It was no 
accident that when Ulstermen wished to subscribe to the most solemn declaration 
they could imagine, they styled it in the Covenant” 34. In his keynote address in 
Newcastle, O’Neill combined identity with the theme of regional prosperity. He 
told those gathered, “the Tyne and the Lagan had given to the life of Britain before, 
we knew also that the nation could not afford to waste human resources such as 
these” 35. It was a speech that was full of the rhetoric of self-help, regional spirit and 
desire for Belfast and Newcastle to become modern British regional capitals. He 
hoped Ulster Week in Newcastle would result in “continuing friendship between 
our people and our compatriots under the British flag” 36.
The theme of being a member of a family under one flag continued. In 1967, 
Brian Faulkner reminded guests from Leeds at a civic reception in Stormont about 
Northern Ireland’s contribution during the Second World War and promised 
that, if called, would do so again. Faulkner also emphasised the modernity of local 
industry proudly stating that Northern Ireland exported “linen, whiskey, ships 
and missiles, optical lenses and oil drills”. This mix of older, traditional industry 
and new technology would in Faulkner’s words play a full part in the “economic 
struggle for prosperity which is to-day so vital to every citizen of Britain” 37. During 
Ulster Week in Leeds, the mayor of Leeds, Alderman Walsh, took his counterpart 
from Belfast, William Geddis on a tour of clothing and textiles produced in Leeds, 
emphasising the links both cities had with the fabric and garment trades 38. Speaking 
to the Leeds Federation Townswomen’s Guilds, Sir Francis Evans (chairman of 
the Ulster Weeks Committee) said that “the future looked bright and hopeful” 39.
In 1968 the Ulster Week campaign arrived in Manchester. The format of 
inviting civic leaders to Belfast before the event continued. At a lunch at Stormont 
the shared industrial commonalities between the two were underscored. The guests 
from Manchester were told of the historical industrial heritage of Manchester and 
34. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Speech by the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 
Captain the RT. HON. Terence O’Neill, D.L., M.P., At a Dinner to Mark the Inauguration of the 
Ulster Week campaign by the Lord Provost, Magistrates and Council of the City of Edinburgh, 
North British Hotel”, 27 September 1965, PRONI.
35. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Speech by the Prime Minister (Captain the 
RT. HON. Terence O’Neill, D.L., M.P.) at a luncheon in Parliament Buildings, Stormont, at 
1.00 P.M. on Friday 3rd June, 1966, for a party from Newcastle-Upon-Tyne visiting Northern 
Ireland in connection with Ulster Week”, 3 June 1966, PRONI.
36. Ibid.
37. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Speech by Minister of Commerce, RT. Hon. Brian 
Faulkner, DL, M.P, At a Luncheon for a Civic Party from Leeds at Stormont on Monday, 21st Novem-
ber 1966, In Connection with the forthcoming Ulster Week”, 21 November 1966, PRONI.
38. “Ulster Week Greets You in Leeds”, Yorkshire Evening Post, 24 April 1967.
39. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Extracts from an Address on the Development 
of Northern Ireland given by Sir Francis Evans, Chairman of the Ulster Weeks Committee, at 
a rally organised by the Leeds Federation of Townswomen’s Guilds and held in the town hall, 
Leeds”, 4 May 1967, PRONI.
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Northern Ireland and that “Manchester was not just another provincial city” but 
was a “great capital of the north” 40. In what was part speech, part lecture they were 
told that “to show people who you are, you must show them what you can do” 41. 
When the event was launched the Manchester Evening News reported that the city 
had been “taken over by the Red Hand” and with no sense of irony reported that 
it was a “drum thumping show and parade of Northern Ireland” 42.
In Birmingham, the Minister in the Senate of the government in Northern Ireland, 
John Andrews, told his audience that “we are not here as foreigners, but as fellow 
citizens of the United Kingdom”. He continued, “we want it to remain united” and 
that “we believe we have a contribution to make to the life of this nation, our nation” 43. 
This message was regarded as so important even the press release of Andrews’ speech 
literally underlined unionist’s desire to remain within the United Kingdom. In the 
attempt to reinforce their Britishness they even arranged for the cast and writers of 
that most British of institutions, The Archers, to promote Ulster bacon 44.
In his biography, O’Neill would remember the first Ulster Week in Nottingham 
“plastered with Red Hands” and as a “roaring success” 45. Despite O’Neill’s enthusiasm 
the report on the effectiveness of the Ulster Week in Nottingham highlighted some 
concerns. The Belfast Telegraph reported that sales had been “spasmodic” and locals 
told the organisers that “you don’t know how to project your image over here” 46. 
Whilst the Red Hand remained a crucial symbol of unionist identity, they found 
that it meant little outside Northern Ireland. The use of the Red Hand as the most 
significant market image was found to mean “nothing to the average Englishman” 
and that it would need “elaborate explanation” 47. There had been concerns about 
the use of the “Red Hand” during the planning stages for the event but after a brief 
discussion its use had been passed unanimously 48.
It had previously been decided to avoid any rural or stereotypical images and 
to concentrate on scientific and technological progress. There was also another 
reason for the reluctance to emphasise rural images, the organising committee did 
not want to risk anything that may portray the event as Irish. Anything that had the 
potential to express anything other than a British Ulster would be prohibited, there 
would be no “jaunting cars, Irish dancing, colleens, leprechauns, etc.” 49. Despite 
40. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Lunch for Manchester Civic Party”, 12 February 1968, 
PRONI.
41. Ibid.
42. “It’s a take-over by the Red Hand”, Manchester Evening News, 4 March 1968.
43. Government of Northern Ireland, press release: “Speech by Senator The Rt. Hon. J. L. O. Andrews, 
D.L., At The Inauguration of Ulster Week in Birmingham”, 21 July 1969, PRONI. Please note the 
underlined sections of the original document, reproduced here in italics.
44. Birmingham Post, 29 January 1969. The Archers is a long running radio drama, first broadcast in 
1951. It still retains one of the largest radio audiences in the UK.
45. Terence O’Neill, The Autobiography of Terence O’Neill, London, Hart-Davis, 1972, p. 64.
46. G. McEvoy, “Nottingham and the Bridge We Built in 6 Days”, Belfast Telegraph, 2 November 1964.
47. “Report: Ulster Week in Nottingham”, 30 November 1964, PRONI.
48. Ulster Weeks Committee, “Minutes of Meeting held at Stormont Castle”, 6 July 1964, PRONI.
49. Ibid.
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their initial concerns, it was decided that a strictly modernist approach limited the 
type of window displays and marketing material that could be used. It was agreed 
that the best approach would be to combine modernity with established images 
used by the Northern Ireland Tourist Board, to show that Northern Ireland was a 
“progressive industrial centre” and a place which could provide “the Englishman 
a quiet holiday such as he cannot get in his own country” 50. It was decided that 
there needed to be a broader approach to Ulster Weeks and that if there was a 
failure to promote all aspects of Northern Ireland then it would become little 
more than an exercise in “hard selling” 51. It was clear that they were going to have 
do considerable work to show they were a genuine member of the British family. 
Further, it was concluded that the over-concentration on technology had proved 
to be something of a hinderance. The result of this was that going forward Ulster 
Weeks would contain a rather clumsy mix of the modern and traditional.
Any concerns about the content and direction of Ulster Weeks were put aside 
and the initial week in Nottingham was regarded as a success. There were window 
and in-store displays in almost two hundred stores. The local newspapers and 
trade journals had all produced supplements covering the event and it was widely 
reported by local television and radio. In Northern Ireland the results of Ulster 
Week in Nottingham were published in The Ulster Yearbook. It was announced 
that “It proved extremely successful and clearly indicated that there was scope for 
a series of Ulster Weeks in Great Britain” 52.
For all the pomp and circumstances of military parades and the positive spin 
portrayed by The Ulster Yearbook, there were already indications that all was not as 
it seemed. The opening of Ulster Week in Nottingham received just one mention of 
a mere thirteen words on page 19 of The Guardian 53. The sales of eggs in Cheshire, 
a retiring midwife and a fire at a scrap rubber dump in Shropshire were all given 
greater prominence.
Behind the scenes, cracks were appearing between O’Neill and those resistant 
to any attempt at change such as Northern Ireland Senator John Barnhill 54. In 
cabinet, by 1966, Brian Faulkner was openly opposing Ulster Weeks and much of 
O’Neill’s other initiatives 55. In Stormont, Dr. Robert Nixon MP (Ulster Unionist 
North Down), questioned O’Neill about the use of the word Ulster in “Ulster 
Weeks” as it was a “misnomer” and “incorrect politically and geographically” 56. 
Dr. Nixon had previously been a thorn in the side of O’Neill and the Ulster 
Unionists over the siting of the New University of Ulster in Coleraine, not 
50. “Ulster Week in Nottingham”, report, 30 November 1964, PRONI.
51. Ibid.
52. Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, The Ulster Yearbook: The Official Handbook of Northern 
Ireland 1963-1965, Belfast, HMSO, 1965.
53. “News in Brief”, The Guardian, 26 October 1964.
54. “Conservative Stand Annoys Nationalists”, The Irish Times, 17 January 1964.
55. Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the Crossroads: Ulster Unionism in the O’Neill Years, 1960-
1969, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 76.
56. Parliamentary questions, no. 9, 16 October 1966, PRONI.
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Londonderry 57. Despite placing full page advertisements in The Sunday Times and 
The Financial Times, the British press were far more interested in the 50th anni-
versary of the Easter Rising and the growing presence of Ian Paisley 58.
Whilst they were trying to promote a modern Northern Ireland, worries con-
tinued over the separation of “Ulster” from the Republic of Ireland. Older concerns 
about the British public’s inability to differentiate between the two persisted. When 
products from the Republic of Ireland were being promoted at Harrods, the potential 
of either a joint promotion or confusion between “Ulster” and “Irish” products 
caused tensions in Stormont. Concerns included any impact that any joint promo-
tion would have on the success of the Ulster Weeks campaign. Considerable funds 
had already been spent on promoting Ulster Weeks and they did not welcome any 
potential distractions. It was acknowledged that the Ulster linen manufacturers 
had used the term “Irish” for several years, but it was felt that they were so well 
established, that consumers would recognise the difference. After considerable 
discussion, any joint participation was rejected and it was decided that “there 
must be no blurring of Northern Ireland’s separate identity within Ireland or of 
her links with Northern Ireland” 59. Rejecting the idea of a joint trade promotion 
at Harrods, the Northern Ireland government decided to proceed with its own 
pitch to London’s consumers with a marketing push at Selfridges 60. However, the 
blurring of the modern and traditional in the Ulster Weeks campaigns continued.
O’Neill hoped to transfer some of the ideas from Ulster Weeks into politics at 
home. This was to be called the Programme to Enlist the People or PEP for short. 
It was hoped that it would encourage a true form of civic society in Northern 
Ireland 61. However, despite O’Neill’s public attempts at reconciliation and the PEP 
initiative little was achieved. He was offering too little to gain any credit with the 
burgeoning civil rights movement. It was a veneer. As argued by Marianne Elliott 
these efforts were too slow and crippled by constant, blundering insensitivity such as 
the naming of Craigavon and the siting of the new university at Coleraine 62. It was 
already too late for O’Neill’s PEP campaign as nationalists and civil rights activists 
were already creating and becoming embedded in their own community projects. 
The PEP campaign was rejected by all sides. The growing civil rights movement 
57. Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the Crossroads…, p. 53-60. “Capt. O’Neill Denies He 
Influenced Lockwood”, The Irish Times, 8 May 1965; “Neglect of the West Is Charged”, The Irish 
Times, 17 January 1964; “In the Grip of History”, The Times, 12 April 1965.
58. “John Bull’s Political Slum”, The Sunday Times, 3 July 1966; “Advertisers Announcement”, 
The Times, 28 November 1966; Kathy Branham, “We Love Living in Northern Ireland”, The 
Financial Times, 14 July 1965.
59. “Extracts from Cabinet Conclusions: Irish Trade Promotion Campaign at Harrods”, 12 February 1965, 
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60. Mellon Centre for Migration Studies, The Ulster Yearbook: The Official Handbook of Northern 
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62. Marianne Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster: A History, London, Penguin, 2000, p. 409.
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wanted “Civil Rights not Civic Weeks” 63 and Ian Paisley had already determined to 
tear down the bridges O’Neill was “in his stupidity and folly” attempting to build 64.
Although O’Neill would continue to use the language of modernisation, the 
British press were turning their interest away from Ulster Weeks to the growing civil 
rights campaign. Whilst he wanted to be promoting his PEP campaign and Ulster 
Weeks, O’Neill had to defend himself and his government as The Times reported 
on resignation of Professor Geoffrey Copcutt and that Catholics were “Ulster’s 
Second-Class Citizens” 65. The Times painted a grim picture of life in Northern 
Ireland far removed from the social liberalisation taking place in the rest of the 
United Kingdom. It was presented as a province far removed from the modernism 
that O’Neill was keen to promote. The message of Ulster Weeks was failing.
Ulster Weeks soon became entangled with the protests and violence that was 
emerging in Northern Ireland. Manchester retained one of the most politically 
active Irish communities in Britain and whilst Michael Herbert records that there 
were no public protests about Ulster Week or O’Neill in Manchester, some were 
willing to make their views known. Manchester retained one of the largest first-
generation Irish populations outside of London. Manchester Ardwick (10.5%), 
Manchester Moss Side (8.08%) and Manchester Exchange (6.55%) were amongst 
the few constituencies outside the Midlands or the Greater South East with Irish 
populations greater than 5% 66. In contrast Harold Wilson’s Huyton constituency 
only had a first-generation Irish population of 1.14% 67. Manchester also retained 
an active branch of the Connolly Association. When Desmond Greaves visited in 
1964, he concluded that the local branch was “in a position to raise the Irish ques-
tion unaided” and that Manchester contained “the most advanced and politically 
intelligent workers of Britain, the direct descendants of the chartists” 68.
Not content with lobbying a local MP, Paul Rose, letter writers in Manchester 
used Ulster Week to send their concerns to O’Neill. One individual from Sale 
was magnanimous enough to offer O’Neill every success for Ulster Week in 
Manchester but wanted him to “ensure progress towards full social justice to the 
whole community” 69. O’Neill in his polite, patrician style, dismissed concerns over 
discrimination as nothing more than the “product of fertile political imaginations”, 
further he blamed the policy of nationalist abstentionism for the failure of Catholics 
to gain greater political representation.
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The façade of O’Neill’s reformism was increasingly exposed. In Leicester 
he was heckled by students who were among the crowds at the launch of Ulster 
Week 70. Instead of launching Ulster Week and promoting Ulster to the shoppers 
and traders of Leicester he found himself surrounded by hordes of reporters. They 
were demanding an explanation as to why television reports and newspapers 
were full of pictures of Gerry Fitt MP, with “blood streaming down his head” 71.
In common with Manchester, Birmingham had retained an economic pull 
for Irish migrants. Birmingham Sparkbrook had long been a receiving area and 
in 1966 7.42% of its population were from the Republic of Ireland 72. Further, 
between 1940 and 1960 the population of Coventry grew by 31%. In 1951 the Irish 
represented 3% of the population of Coventry and had grown to 5% by 1961 73. 
Despite this, Desmond Greaves was not encouraged by the activity of the Connolly 
Association. In 1964 he was withering in his criticism of the Irish population 
in Birmingham. Writing in The Irish Democrat he told them that “they really 
should be ashamed of themselves” and that “nowhere is the Irish community so 
weak and ineffectual”. He noted that only a few individuals were trying to keep 
the Connolly Association, the United Ireland Association and Clan na hÉireann 
alive 74. Greaves’ feelings towards Birmingham fluctuated over time. In many 
ways, these mirrored the saliency of Ireland as an issue in British politics. By 1978 
Greaves took a much softer and more nostalgic view of the Irish in Birmingham, 
particularly the period of middle 1950s 75.
The events in Northern Ireland were now clearly overshadowing coverage of 
Ulster Week in Birmingham, with the local newspapers such as the Birmingham 
Post giving far more column inches to Northern Ireland than Ulster Week. Whilst 
Greaves had been criticising Irish political activity in Birmingham, the violence in 
Northern Ireland did result in an upsurge in activity. In Birmingham, John Andrews, 
the Northern Ireland Deputy Prime Minister, attending a dinner given by the 
Birmingham Ulster Society, told reporters that Northern Ireland was thankful for 
the use of troops to guard key installations. As he was making this claim, protests in 
Birmingham were becoming more and more visible 76. Civil rights demonstrations 
had been steadily growing and in response the police felt in necessary to increase 
the number of both uniformed and plain-clothes officers on duty 77. At a reception 
to thank all those from Birmingham involved in Ulster Week, guests were care-
70. “Wilson Orders Report Derry Riots”, Coventry Evening Telegraph, 7 October 1968.
71. Terence O’Neill, The Autobiography of Terence O’Neill, p. 102.
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74. “What the Irish in Britain Are Doing about the Election”.
75.  C. Desmond Greaves, Reminiscences of the Connolly Association. An Emerald Jubilee Pamphlet, 
London, Connolly Association, 1978, p. 26.
76. “Andrews Thankful for Use of Troops”, Belfast Telegraph, 21 April 1969.
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fully vetted by the police. As they arrived, they were met by forty members of the 
Birmingham Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland (CSJNI) demanding 
“new houses not thatched slums” and for the government to “Abolish Tyranny 
in Northern Ireland” 78. Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberal Party, attended a 
meeting organised by the CSJNI Birmingham and told a crowd of six hundred 
that “Unionists had now received a clear warning that the oppressed were no 
long sunk in apathy” 79. Others in Birmingham decided to go beyond attending 
demonstrations. The building that was being used to provide offices for the Ulster 
Week campaign in Birmingham was daubed with graffiti calling for “One Man, 
One Vote” 80. Soon this would escalate. A petrol bomb was thrown at the same 
office, however it missed and hit the offices of an auctioneers on the floor below 81. 
The Ulster Week display in Rackhams department store experienced a bomb scare 
as a hoax device was found hidden in the replica of the Irish (Ulster) cottage 82.
Protests over events in Northern Ireland were not confined to those from 
the left or the centre of British politics. Robert Walter (who would later become 
Conservative MP for North Dorset from 1997 to 2015) was chairman of the Aston 
University Conservative Association. He made his views known in a letter published 
in the Birmingham Post. In his letter he recognised that “There is social injustice in 
Northern Ireland and in many areas the basic principles are denied”. He continued 
that “we have the Rev. Ian Paisley, the Orange Order and too many Ulstermen 
perpetuating the present situation in the name of God and the Queen”. He called 
for continued support for Prime Minister O’Neill and that
The time has come for the Protestant Church and the Conservative Party to make 
it clear to the people of Ulster that they do not support, and find totally repugnant, 
the movements being carried out in their name. The citizens of Birmingham who are 
Protestants or Conservative have a duty during Ulster Week to make it clear to their 
leaders that they and the people of Great Britain support the struggle of the people of 
Ulster for social justice and totally reject the reactionary movements in the Protestant 
Church and the Unionist Party 83.
Ulster Week in Birmingham was the last to take place. It was overwhelmed by 
the violence that had erupted in Northern Ireland. However, it was already facing 
multiple hurdles. Although wanting to be seen as a moderniser, this did not fit 
with O’Neill’s patrician-like character. This was exposed when he attempted to 
use elements of Ulster Weeks as a foundation for his PEP campaign. It was old-
fashioned, ignored and out of step when placed side by side with the civil rights 
movement.
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Ulster Weeks were part of a larger response to shifting political themes. This 
included the gradual abandoning of autarky in the Republic of Ireland, the move 
by the governments in Dublin and London towards joining the Common Market 
and the changing nature and direction of the British economy. O’Neill’s opponents 
failed to recognise that despite his attempts at pragmatic response to these events, 
he would not jeopardise Northern Ireland’s place within the Union. However, his 
political opponents, always dutifully examining unionism for signs of fracture 
were concerned. Those within unionism that opposed him did not want to take 
any chances. They were worried that any economic, political and social reform, no 
matter how slow, would threaten their political control and dominance. Further, 
they did not want their position eroded to the point that would allow Ian Paisley 
to exploit any divisions. O’Neill was now facing a direct challenge from that por-
tion of unionism which objected to any attempts at reform. His opponents from 
within unionism were now constantly looking for any remonstrance which could 
threaten their political ascendency or further expose the fact that unionism is far 
from monolithic 84. Unionist politicians turned away from attempting to convince 
their fellow citizens that Northern Ireland was a modern, integral part of the United 
Kingdom. Instead they concentrated on ensuring the drum beat of loyalty was used 
to rally their supporters at home.
Drum and flag unionism of the sort that brought down O’Neill and played a 
considerable role in the outbreak of political violence also had consequences for 
how they were viewed outside Northern Ireland. The uber-unionism of some in 
Northern Ireland and elements of which would later mutate into Ulster Loyalism 
were beginning to be regarded as a dysfunctional element, a regional abnormality 85. 
In Britain the multiple identities within unionism would never escape caricature as 
the unthinking follower of the “tumour” of the Lambeg drum in everything from 
newspaper cartoons to the poetry of Seamus Heaney 86.
The flag of loyalty comprehensively covered those unionists that chose to 
stand on a different point on the political compass. Few in Britain know that 
members of the Protestant working class during the 1930s rejected sectarianism 
and some even volunteered to fight against Franco in Spain. Harry Midgley 
who during his own controversial political journey opposed Franco, only to be 
rejected by both unionists and nationalists, is largely unknown outside Northern 
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Ireland 87. Further to this, also largely unknown in Britain remains Geoffrey 
Dudgeon, following his successful battle to decriminalise homosexuality in 
Northern Ireland, now who sits as a unionist Councillor. Even fewer are aware 
of Harford Montgomery Hyde MP (Belfast North). He was amongst the most 
prominent and vocal MPs speaking in support of homosexual law reform in 
Britain and the Wolfenden Report 88. This stance would ultimately cost him his 
seat. Many unionists, as argued by Connal Parr, have deliberately forgotten that 
unionism also contains a labour tradition and finds itself comfortable on the 
left of the political compass 89. Tom Paulin has also called into question Ulster 
unionists’ own historical memory 90. This has not been without consequences. 
Alistair Cooke (Lord Lexden) would later recognise that Ulster unionism had a 
problem; the rest of the United Kingdom. He concluded that Ulster unionists are 
part of “a nation which is reluctant to recognise them” and that “grave exception 
is taken in Britain to the manner in which Unionists defend their case” 91. He 
was not alone in this, Ferdinand Mount, who was responsible for authorising 
that section of the 1983 Conservative manifesto came to the conclusion that the 
rest of the British simply viewed Ulster unionism as “irredeemably foreign” 92.
Despite attempts such as Ulster Weeks and previously the Festival of Britain 
to show the rest of the United Kingdom that Northern Ireland was an integral part 
of the British family of nations, regressive elements within unionism in Northern 
Ireland continue to drown out those progressive voices who want to move away from 
sectarian politics and to focus on issues of social justice. The Democratic Unionist 
Party (DUP) and its rejection of equal marriage and hard-line on reproductive 
rights ensures that it is viewed as a dysfunctional element within the UK. This has 
resulted in, at best, an ambiguous attitude by the rest of the British to the retention 
of Northern Ireland as part of the Union. Much of the perceptions regarding Ulster 
unionism remains a stereotype, which, although frequently challenged by progres-
sive unionists, is quickly submerged once again under the wave of celebrations for 
the Battle of the Boyne. Although much about Ulster Weeks and O’Neill’s claims 
of reform were a veneer, they did offer an opportunity to show Britain that other 
forms of unionism existed in Northern Ireland.
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Ulster Weeks are now largely forgotten 93. Regressive actors within unionism 
continue to dominate and ensure that some in Northern Ireland remain socially 
excluded. Poverty, quality and social justice do not recognise sectarian boundaries. 
The DUP’s track record on these issues has allowed parts of the British left to 
demonise unionism in Northern Ireland without making any effort to understand it. 
Consequently, the monolithic negative labelling of unionism remains. This means, 
those unionists who are working hard for social justice in Northern Ireland will 
remain hidden from view.
In her latest attempts to defend the DUP position on Brexit, Arlene Foster used 
rhetoric that would not have been out of place during the Ulster Weeks campaigns:
I firmly believe the United Kingdom is economically better together than apart, but 
alongside the enrichment of our business life we must look at the cultural, sporting, 
intellectual and historical contributions which bind us together as a nation 94.
These words are regarded by many in Britain as thin gruel. Tom Paulin regarded 
hard-line unionism as “a snarl of superficial or negative attitudes” and “A pro-
vincialism of the most disabling kind” 95. It is a view that many outside Northern 
Ireland share, “they don’t like what they see” 96. As Brexit widens the fractures in 
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